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     OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
 
Fuentes, Circuit Judge: 
 
Peter Murphy (“Murphy”) has filed an appeal from the 
decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to 
Millennium Radio Group, Craig Carton, and Ray Rossi (the 
“Station Defendants”) on Murphy‟s claims for violation of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), copyright 
infringement, and defamation under state law.  For the 
reasons given below, we reverse on all counts. 
 
I. 
Background 
 
In 2006, Murphy was hired by the magazine New 
Jersey Monthly (“NJM”) to take a photo of Craig Carton and 
Ray Rossi, who at the time were the hosts of a show on the 
New Jersey radio station WKXW, which is owned by 
Millennium Radio Group.  NJM used the photo to illustrate an 
article in its “Best of New Jersey” issue naming Carton and 
Rossi “best shock jocks” in the state.  The photo (“the 
Image”) depicted Carton and Rossi standing, apparently nude, 
behind a WKXW sign.  Murphy retained the copyright to the 
Image.  
 
An unknown employee of WKXW then scanned in the 
Image from NJM and posted the resulting electronic copy to 
the WKXW website and to another website, myspacetv.com.  
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The resulting image, as scanned and posted to the Internet, 
cut off part of the original NJM caption referring to the “Best 
of New Jersey” award.  It also eliminated NJM‟s gutter credit 
(that is, a credit placed in the inner margin, or “gutter,” of a 
magazine page, ordinarily printed in a smaller type and 
running perpendicular to the relevant image on the page) 
identifying Murphy as the author of the Image.  The WKXW 
website invited visitors to alter the Image using photo-
manipulation software and submit the resulting versions to 
WKXW.  A number of visitors eventually submitted their 
versions of the photo to WKXW, and it posted 26 of those 
submissions to its site.  The Station Defendants never 
received Murphy‟s permission to make use of the Image. 
 
When Murphy discovered the Image on the WKXW 
website, he communicated, via his attorney, with WKXW, 
demanding that the alleged infringement cease.  Shortly 
thereafter, Carton and Rossi made Murphy the subject of one 
of their shows, allegedly stating that one should not do 
business with him because he would sue his business 
partners.  They also allegedly implied that Murphy, who 
identifies himself as a married heterosexual and the natural 
father of children, was a homosexual.  
 
In April 2008, Murphy sued the Station Defendants for 
violations of § 1202 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998 (“DMCA”), copyright infringement under the 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and defamation under 
New Jersey law.  Murphy then served various discovery 
requests upon the Station Defendants, including deposition 
requests for Carton and Rossi and a corporate representative 
of Millennium Radio Group.  At the behest of both Murphy 
and the Station Defendants, a number of delays in the 
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discovery process followed.  The magistrate judge held a 
conference with the parties after the end of the discovery 
period designated in the original case-management schedule, 
at which point only limited discovery had actually taken 
place.  At that conference, the judge set a June 2009 deadline 
for the Station Defendants to file a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim with respect to both the defamation 
and the DMCA claims.
1
   
 
In May 2009, Murphy served additional discovery 
requests on the Station Defendants, who, in response, 
requested a stay of discovery while the motion to dismiss was 
pending.  The magistrate judge granted this stay. 
 
The Station Defendants then filed a motion for 
summary judgment on all claims.  In response, Murphy filed 
a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (now Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(d)), with accompanying affidavit, requesting additional 
discovery before the resolution of any summary judgment 
motions.   
 
In March 2010, the District Court denied Murphy‟s 
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) and granted the 
Station Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment on all 
                                              
1
 Murphy describes this in the current briefing as a motion to 
dismiss.  Some of the papers suggest that it was scheduled as 
a motion for summary judgment.  The difference is 
inconsequential for our purposes. 
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counts.  Murphy now appeals the grant of summary judgment 
on all counts.
2
      
 
II. 
    Discussion 
  
A.  DMCA claim 
  
Murphy argues that, by reproducing the Image on the 
two websites without the NJM credit identifying him as the 
author, the Station Defendants violated the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.  The DMCA was passed in 1998 
to address the perceived need of copyright owners for “legal 
sanctions” to enforce various technological measures they had 
adopted to prevent the unauthorized reproduction of their 
works.  See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 
458 (2007).  It also served “to conform United States 
copyright law to its obligations under two World Intellectual 
Property Organization („WIPO‟) treaties, which require 
contracting parties to provide effective legal remedies against 
the circumvention of protective technological measures used 
by copyright owners.”  MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 
629 F.3d 928, 942 (9th Cir. 2010). 
   
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Our review of the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary, which means that we will affirm only if 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Noel v. 
Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010). 
7 
 
The most well-known provision of the DMCA, § 1201, 
grants a cause of action to copyright owners for the 
“circumvent[ion of] a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work.”  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).3  
Thus, for example, if a movie studio encrypts a DVD so that 
it cannot be copied without special software or hardware, and 
an individual uses his own software to “crack” the encryption 
and make copies without permission, the studio may pursue 
the copier both for simple infringement under the Copyright 
                                              
3
 Section 1201 provides: 
(a) Violations regarding circumvention of 
technological measures.— 
(1)(A) No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under this title... 
(3)  As used in this subsection-- 
(A) to „circumvent a technological measure‟ 
means to descramble a scrambled work, to 
decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to 
avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a 
technological measure, without the authority of 
the copyright owner; and  
(B) a technological measure „effectively 
controls access to a work‟ if the measure, in the 
ordinary course of its operation, requires the 
application of information, or a process or a 
treatment, with the authority of the copyright 
owner, to gain access to the work. 
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Act and, separately, for his circumvention of the encryption, 
which is a “technological measure” designed to “control . . . 
access to” the DVD, under the DMCA.  See Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).  
Before the passage of the DMCA, the studio would have had 
only a cause of action under the Copyright Act.  The DMCA 
has been criticized in some circles for its “potentially 
overbroad scope . . . and its ability to chill legitimate and, in 
some cases, constitutionally protected speech.”  G. 
Parchomovsky & P. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 Cornell 
Law Review 91, 104 (2010).
4
        
 
Murphy‟s claim against the Station defendants 
involves § 1202 of the DMCA, which deals with “copyright 
management information” (“CMI”).  Section 1202(b) 
provides in part: 
 
No person shall, without the authority of the 
copyright owner or the law— 
(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright 
management information, [or] 
[...] 
                                              
4
 Some courts have held, for instance, that the DMCA 
substantially narrows the protection offered by the “fair use” 
affirmative defense to copyright infringement by permitting 
plaintiffs to bring causes of action for circumvention even 
when they cannot bring causes of action for infringement.  
See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. 629 F.3d 928, 950-52 
(9th Cir. 2010); contra Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink 
Techs. Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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(3) distribute, import for distribution, or 
publicly perform works, copies of works, or 
phonorecords, knowing that copyright 
management information has been removed or 
altered without authority of the copyright owner 
or the law, knowing or, with respect to civil 
remedies under section 1203, having reasonable 
grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, 
facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any 
right under this title.  
Section 1202(c) then defines “copyright management 
information” as certain types of “information conveyed in 
connection with copies . . . of a work . . ., including in digital 
form, . . . : (2) [t]he name of, and other identifying 
information about, the author of a work . . . .”5 
  
Murphy‟s argument is straightforward.  He contends 
that the NJM gutter credit identifying him as the author of the 
Image is CMI because it is “the name of . . . the author of [the 
Image]” and was “conveyed in connection with copies of [the 
Image].”  By posting the Image on the two websites without 
the credit, therefore, the Station Defendants “remove[d] or 
alter[ed]” CMI and “distribute[d]” a work knowing that its 
CMI had been “removed or altered” in violation of § 1202.6   
                                              
5
 Only the type of information identified in subsection (2) is 
at issue in this case. 
6
 Because the District Court rejected Murphy‟s argument on 
this point, it did not consider whether summary judgment was 
appropriate on the other elements of a § 1202 claim, such as 
whether the Station Defendants acted knowing that the 
removal would induce or enable infringement.  Thus, 
10 
 
 
The Station Defendants, on the other hand, insist that 
one cannot read § 1202 in isolation, but must interpret it in 
conjunction with § 1201 and in light of the legislative history 
of the DMCA to impose an additional limitation on the 
definition of CMI.  They argue that the chapter as a whole 
protects various kinds of automated systems which protect 
and manage copyrights.  Specifically, § 1201 covers  the 
systems (the “technological measures” discussed above) that 
protect copyrighted materials and § 1202 covers the systems 
that manage copyrighted materials (such as the name of the 
author of a work).  Therefore, they conclude, despite the 
apparently plain language of § 1202, information like the 
name of the author of a work is not CMI unless it also 
functions as part of an “automated copyright protection or 
management system.”  In other words, to remove, as the 
Station Defendants did, a printed credit from a magazine 
photograph which was then posted to a website does not 
violate § 1202, because the credit, although apparently 
meeting the definition of § 1202(c)(2), was not part of an 
“automated copyright protection or management system.”  
They claim that both the legislative history of the DMCA and 
the language of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
treaties which the DMCA implemented support such a 
reading.  Viewed thus, the Station Defendants argue, § 1202 
will be seen not to apply to Murphy‟s name as it appeared in 
the gutter credit near the Image. 
  
We are not aware of any other federal appellate courts 
which have considered whether the definition of “copyright 
                                                                                                     
although the Station Defendants attempt to raise that issue 
now, we take no position on it at this time. 
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management information” should be restricted to the context 
of “automated copyright protection or management 
systems.”7  We begin, as we must, with the text of § 1202.  
“Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent 
through the ordinary meaning of its language, every exercise 
of statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the 
plain language of the statute . . . . When the statute‟s language 
is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the test is not absurd—is to enforce it 
according to its terms.”  Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 
585 F.3d 753, 759 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations, quotations marks, 
and parentheticals omitted).  The exception to this rule is 
narrowly cast.  “Generally, where the text of a statute is 
unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written and 
only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in 
the legislative history will justify a departure from that 
language.” In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 
298, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
There is nothing particularly difficult about the text of 
§ 1202.  Even the Station Defendants, and the courts whose 
decisions  they cite, do not contend that § 1202 is, in itself, 
                                              
7
 The district courts which have considered the question to 
date have reached different conclusions.  Some have indeed 
adopted the Station Defendants‟ reading of § 1202.  See, e.g., 
IQ Group v. Wiesner Pub., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 
2006); Textile Secrets Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand, Inc., 524 F. 
Supp. 2d. 1184, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  A number of others, 
however, have rejected it.  See, e.g., Agence France Presse v. 
Morel, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2011 WL 147718, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 14, 2011).  
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ambiguous or unclear.  Read in isolation, § 1202 simply 
establishes a cause of action for the removal of (among other 
things) the name of the author of a work when it has been 
“conveyed in connection with copies of” the work.  The 
statute imposes no explicit requirement that such information 
be part of an “automated copyright protection or management 
system,” as the Station Defendants claim.  In fact, it appears 
to be extremely broad, with no restrictions on the context in 
which such information must be used in order to qualify as 
CMI.  If there is a difficulty here, it is a problem of policy, 
not of logic.  Such an interpretation might well provide an 
additional cause of action under the DMCA in many 
circumstances in which only an action for copyright 
infringement could have been brought previously.  Whether 
or not this result is desirable, it is not absurd, as might 
compel us to make a more restrictive reading of § 1202‟s 
scope.
8
     
 
                                              
8
 The Station Defendants argue that this interpretation would 
cause the DMCA to “swallow up” the Copyright Act, 
effectively making the latter redundant.  In fact, if an 
infringer merely copies an entire work whole—as in the 
example above of a pirated film on DVD—Section 1202 will 
probably not be implicated, as the infringer will not have 
removed or altered any CMI.  The Station Defendants point 
out that most fair uses will involve the removal of CMI.  
However, unlike § 1201, § 1202 applies only when a 
defendant knows or has reasonable grounds to know that the 
removal will “induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal” an 
infringement.  Thus, those intending to make fair use of a 
copyrighted work are unlikely to be liable under § 1202.   
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The Station Defendants argue that to read § 1202 by 
itself is to take too narrow a view of the “plain language” of 
the statutory text.  When interpreting statutory language, we 
must examine the statute as a whole, rather than considering 
provisions in isolation.  Samantar v. Yousuf, --- U.S. ---, 130 
S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010).  However, nothing in § 1201, the 
provision regarding circumvention of “technological 
measures” discussed above to which the Station Defendants 
point most insistently, restricts the meaning of CMI in § 1202 
to information contained in “automated copyright protection 
or management systems.”  Section 1201 does not mention 
“copyright management information”; in fact, it does not refer 
to § 1202 at all.  Neither does it contain the phrase 
“automated copyright protection or management systems.”9  
Similarly, § 1202 does not refer to § 1201, and the definition 
of CMI is located squarely in § 1202. 
 
If, in fact, § 1201 and § 1202 were meant to have such 
interrelated interpretations, it is peculiar that there is no 
explicit indication of this in the text of either provision.  
Instead, to all appearances, § 1201 and § 1202 establish 
independent causes of action which arise from different 
conduct on the part of defendants, albeit with similar civil 
remedies and criminal penalties.  It may strike some as more 
intellectually harmonious to interpret the prohibition of 
removal of CMI in § 1202 as restricted to the context of § 
1201, but nothing in the text of § 1201 actually dictates that it 
                                              
9
 The Station Defendants do not argue that “technological 
measures,” as defined in § 1201, are the same as “automated 
copyright protection or management systems.” 
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should be taken to limit the meaning of “copyright 
management information.”10  
 
As for the purpose of the statute as a whole, it is 
undisputed that the DMCA was intended to expand—in some 
cases, as discussed above, significantly—the rights of 
copyright owners.  The parties here differ only as to their 
conclusions regarding the extent to which the DMCA 
expanded those rights.  Murphy‟s definition of CMI provides 
for a significantly broader cause of action than the Station 
Defendants‟ does.  However, the Station Defendants can 
point to nothing in the statute as a whole which compels the 
adoption of their reading instead of Murphy‟s.  In short, 
considering the purpose of the statute does not provide us 
with meaningful guidance in this case.     
 
As discussed above, therefore, in accordance with In 
re Philadelphia Newspapers, we must look to the legislative 
history of the DMCA only for that “extraordinary showing of 
contrary intentions” which would justify rejecting a 
straightforward reading of § 1202.  599 F.3d at 314 (holding 
that a narrow exception to the plain meaning rule applies in 
the “rare cases [where] the literal application of a statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
                                              
10
 The Station Defendants point out that the title of the 
chapter to which § 1201 and § 1202 belong is “Copyright 
Protection and Management Systems.”  However, “[i]t is a 
well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that titles and 
section headings cannot limit the plain meaning of statutory 
text where that text is clear.”  M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-
Operated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 348 
(3d Cir. 2003).   
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its drafters” (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 
U.S. 235, 242 (1989))).  The Station Defendants rely on the 
survey of the legislative history undertaken by the courts in 
IQ Group v. Wiesner Pub., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 
2006) and Textile Secrets Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand, Inc., 524 
F. Supp. 2d. 1184, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  The IQ Group 
decision placed most emphasis on a “white paper” of the 
working group of the Information Infrastructure Task Force 
(IITF), the organization that produced the first draft of §§ 
1201 and 1202.  This white paper reported that  
A combination of file- and system-based access 
controls using encryption technologies, digital 
signatures and steganography are . . . employed 
by owners of works to address copyright 
management concerns. . . . To implement these 
rights management functions, information will 
likely be included in digital versions of a work 
(i.e., copyright management information) to 
inform the user about the authorship and 
ownership of a work . . . . 
409 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (emphasis added).  Thus, the IQ 
Group court concluded, the paper “understood „copyright 
management information‟ to be information . . . that is 
included in digital versions of the work so as to implement 
„rights management functions‟ of „rights management 
systems.‟”  Id. at 595.  And, as the text of § 1202 was not 
altered before its adoption by Congress, the court found that 
this gave a clear indication of Congressional intent.  Id. at 
594-95.  Additionally, the Senate Committee Report to § 
1202 describes CMI as including “such items as the title of 
the work, the author . . . CMI need not be in digital form, but 
CMI in digital form is expressly included.”  Id. at 596. 
16 
 
  
The Textile Secrets court also looked to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization treaties that the DMCA 
was intended to implement.  The WIPO treaties use a term 
“rights management information” and define it as 
“information which identifies the work, the author of the 
work . . . when any of these items of information is attached 
to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the 
communication of a work to the public.”  See, e.g., WIPO 
Copyright Treaty Art. 12 (adopted Dec. 20, 1996), available 
at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#P
89_12682.  They require that parties to the treaties provide 
adequate remedies against the “remov[al] or alter[ation of] 
any electronic rights management information without 
authority.”  Id. (emphasis added)  The Textile Secrets court 
concluded that “electronic rights management information” as 
used in the WIPO treaties and “copyright management 
information” as used in § 1202 must be coterminous in 
meaning.  524 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.  Therefore, it found, 
“copyright management information” must be electronic.  Id. 
  
While this analysis has some force, in the end, the 
strongest case which the Station Defendants can make is that 
the legislative history of the DMCA is consistent with its 
interpretation, not that it actually contradicts the reading 
advocated by Murphy.  The IITF white paper describes CMI 
as “information [that] will likely be included in digital 
versions of a work . . . to inform the user about the authorship 
and ownership of a work.”  IQ Group, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 594.  
This description leaves the question of just how that 
information will be included—that is, whether it must be used 
in some form of “an automated copyright protection or 
17 
 
management system” or whether it can be conveyed by other 
means—entirely open.  
 
Similarly, the WIPO treaties‟ definition of “electronic 
rights management information” is “information [that] will 
likely be included in digital versions of a work . . . to inform 
the user about the authorship and ownership of a work.”11  
Although this definition occurs in the context of a broader 
discussion of systems that control access to copyrighted 
works, it does not require that “electronic rights management 
information” be embedded in such systems.12  In addition, 
neither the WIPO treaties nor the DMCA indicate the precise 
relationship between the concepts of CMI and “electronic 
rights management information” as discussed in the treaties.  
The Station Defendants argue that their meanings must be 
identical, but Congress was certainly free, in implementing 
the WIPO treaties, to define “copyright management 
information” more broadly than “electronic rights 
management information.”13 
                                              
11
 The Station Defendants agree with Murphy that, whatever 
CMI is, it is not necessary for it to be “digital.”  For example, 
they concede that a bar code printed in ink on a paper label 
might be CMI. 
12
 Again, the Station Defendants do not argue that CMI must 
be presented in “electronic” form, only that it function in 
connection with an electronic (or automated; the Station 
Defendants treat the terms as interchangeable, though they are 
not) copyright protection or management system. 
13
 There is even a textual argument that Congress did so.  The 
DMCA‟s definition of “copyright management information” 
uses language very similar to that of the WIPO treaties‟ 
18 
 
  
                                                                                                     
definition of “rights management information” (without a 
reference to a medium or format).  Compare  
information conveyed in connection with copies 
. . . of a work . . ., including in digital form, . . . 
: (2) [t]he name of, and other identifying 
information about, the author of a work . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (the DMCA‟s definition of “copyright 
management information” with respect to author-identifying 
information) with  
information which identifies the . . . author of 
the work . . . when [this] information is attached 
to a copy of a work or appears in connection 
with the communication of a work . . . 
WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 12(2) (the WIPO treaties‟ 
definition of “rights management information” for the same). 
The WIPO treaties then go on (as the DMCA does not) to 
impose certain requirements concerning only electronic rights 
management information, which implies that “rights 
management information” might well exist in other forms.  It 
might therefore be argued that the DMCA‟s definition of 
“copyright management information” tracks the more 
expansive WIPO definition of “rights management 
information,” rather than WIPO‟s narrower (if still not clearly 
defined) “electronic rights management information.”  If so, 
then arguments about whether the WIPO treaties intended to 
require electronic rights management information to function 
as part of “an automated copyright protection or management 
system” are irrelevant.   
19 
 
Thus, while it is possible to read the legislative history 
to support the Station Defendants‟ interpretation of CMI, that 
history does not provide the “extraordinary showing of 
contrary intentions” which would compel us to disregard the 
plain language of the statute.  This is especially so because 
the Station Defendants are essentially asking us to rewrite § 
1202 to insert a term—that is, “automated copyright 
protection or management system”—which appears nowhere 
in the text of the DMCA and which lacks a clear definition.  
We would need compelling justification indeed to adopt such 
a statutorily-unmoored interpretation.  
 
Therefore, we find that CMI, as defined in § 1202(c), 
is not restricted to the context of “automated copyright 
protection or management systems.”  Rather, a cause of 
action under § 1202 of the DMCA potentially lies whenever 
the types of information listed in § 1202(c)(1)-(8) and 
“conveyed in connection with copies . . . of a work . . . 
including in digital form” is falsified or removed, regardless 
of the form in which that information is conveyed.  In this 
case, the mere fact that Murphy‟s name appeared in a printed 
gutter credit near the Image rather than as data in an 
“automated copyright protection or management system” 
does not prevent it from qualifying as CMI or remove it from 
the protection of § 1202.
14
 
 
B. Copyright infringement claim 
 
                                              
14
 The Station Defendants also raise the issue of whether they 
“removed” the CMI.  The District Court did not address this 
issue, and we need not do so at this stage of the litigation. 
20 
 
Murphy also argues that the reproduction of the Image 
on the two websites without his consent infringed his 
copyright in the Image.
15
  The Station Defendants, in 
response, assert the affirmative defense of fair use. 
 
The doctrine of fair use places important limitations on 
a copyright owner‟s right to control the use of its work, so 
that the statute does not “stifle the very creativity which that 
law is designed to foster” by preventing further uses of the 
work which enrich our culture and do not significantly 
diminish the value of the original.  See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 577 (1994)).  As codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, the factors 
governing whether a particular use of copyrighted material is 
“fair” are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
                                              
15
 Although Murphy challenged the use of both the original 
Image and the photomanipulated images submitted by 
WKXW fans on the website in the District Court, he has 
appealed the finding of fair use with respect to the use of the 
original Image only. 
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
These four factors may not “be treated in isolation, one 
from another.  All are to be explored, and the results weighed 
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”  Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 578.  However, the analysis of the District Court 
in this case relied most heavily on the first and fourth factors. 
 
1. Purpose and character of the use 
 
The District Court found that the first factor favored 
the Station Defendants, because their use of the Image was 
“transformative.”  When courts evaluate the first factor,  
[t]he central purpose of th[e] investigation is to 
see . . . whether the new work merely 
supersedes the objects of the original creation . . 
. or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message; it 
asks . . . whether and to what extent the new 
work is transformative. 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citations omitted).  The Station Defendants 
assert, and the District Court found, that the Station 
Defendants‟ use of the unaltered Image was transformative in 
this sense.  This conclusion is not persuasive.  The Image was 
originally created to illustrate a NJM article informing the 
public about Carton and Rossi‟s “best of” award; the Station 
Defendants themselves state they “used [the Image] . . . to 
report to their viewers the newsworthy fact of [Carton and 
Rossi‟s] receipt of the magazine‟s award.”  (App‟t Br. 40)  
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Although they claim that the difference is significant, there is, 
in fact, no meaningful distinction between the purpose and 
character of NJM‟s use of the Image and the Station 
Defendants‟ use on the WKXW website. 
 
The Station Defendants argue further that because the 
purpose of their use was “news reporting,” and news 
reporting appears in the Copyright Act‟s nonexhaustive list of 
potential purposes of fair use, Murphy‟s claim must 
necessarily fail.  Under many circumstances, reporters will 
indeed be able to claim a fair use defense against claims of 
infringement.  For instance, had the Image itself become 
controversial due to its “salacious” content, it would likely 
have been fair use for a newspaper to reproduce it to 
accompany an article about the controversy.  However, news 
reporting does not enjoy a blanket exemption from copyright.  
News organizations are not free to use any and all 
copyrighted works without the permission of the creator 
simply because they wish to report on the same events a work 
depicts.  “The promise of copyright would be an empty one if 
it could be avoided merely by dubbing the infringement a fair 
use „news report‟ of the [work].”  Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985) (finding 
verbatim republication of key portions of Gerald Ford‟s 
memoirs not to be fair use).   
 
Instead, news reporting must satisfy the same test as 
other supposedly transformative works.  The Station 
Defendants‟ use of the Image does not do so.  Campbell has 
made it clear that the “heart” of a claim for transformative use 
is “the use of some elements of a prior author‟s composition 
to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that 
author‟s works.”  510 U.S. at 580.  However, if “the 
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commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style 
of the original . . . which the alleged infringer merely uses to 
get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up 
something fresh, the claim to fairness . . . diminishes 
accordingly (if it does not vanish) . . . .”  Id.  The First 
Circuit‟s decision in Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 
235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000), provides an excellent example of 
when the use of a photograph for news purposes qualifies as a 
fair use.  In Nunez, a professional photographer took several 
risqué photographs of Joyce Giraud for use in Giraud‟s 
modeling portfolio.  Id. at 21.  After the photographs were 
taken, Giraud won the Miss Puerto Rico Universe 
competition, and a controversy arose over whether the 
photographs were inappropriate for a Miss Puerto Rico 
Universe.  Id.  A newspaper then published three of the 
photographs, along with several articles about the 
controversy, prompting the photographer to sue for copyright 
infringement and the newspaper to assert the fair use defense.  
Id.  In analyzing whether the newspaper‟s publication of the 
photographs was transformative, the First Circuit noted that 
the photographs serve an “informative function . . . confirmed 
by the newspaper‟s presentation of various news articles and 
interviews in conjunction with the reproduction.”  Id. at 22.  
By “using the photographs in conjunction with editorial 
commentary, [the newspaper] did not merely „supersede[ ] the 
objects of the original creation[s],‟ but instead used the works 
for „a further purpose,‟ giving them a new „meaning, or 
message.‟”  Id. at 23 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).   
 
By contrast, no similar broader news coverage or 
editorial commentary existed in this case, as the Station 
Defendants simply posted Murphy‟s photograph on their 
website.  The absence of any broader commentary—whether 
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explicit or implicit—significantly undercuts the Station 
Defendants‟ argument that their use gave any new meaning to 
the Image.  Instead, it appears that the Station Defendants did 
not want to go to the trouble of creating their own eye-
catching photo of Carton and Rossi to illustrate their 
announcement of the NJM award, but simply appropriated the 
Image for the same purpose.  This is far from transformative.  
And, in the absence of transformativity, other considerations, 
“like the extent of [the use‟s] commerciality,” become more 
important in determining which party the first factor favors.  
Id.    
 
In general, “commercialism . . .weigh[s] against a 
finding of fair use.”  Id. at 579.  The Station Defendants have 
not contested that their use is commercial.  Therefore, as the 
use of the image was not transformative and was commercial, 
the first factor, the purpose and character of the use of the 
image, weighs against the Station Defendants. 
 
2. Impact on the market for the original 
 
The District Court‟s finding that the fourth factor—the 
impact on the market for the original—also favors the Station 
Defendants was also erroneous.  The District Court held that 
Murphy had not established that he had experienced any 
market harm simply by asserting that he would have been 
willing to license the Image if WKXW had approached him.  
It is true that a copyright owner cannot claim market harm 
simply because he would have liked to charge for the use in 
question.  If that were the case, then it would be difficult 
indeed for any fair use defense to succeed.   
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“The fourth fair use factor . . . requires courts to 
consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the 
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by 
the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market for the original.”  Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 590 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  When a copyright owner “clearly does have an 
interest in exploiting a licensing market—and especially 
where the copyright holder has actually succeeded in doing 
so—„it is appropriate that potential licensing revenues . . . be 
considered in a fair use analysis.‟”  Princeton Univ. Press v. 
Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 
930 (2d Cir. 1994)).  In determining whether such a licensing 
market exists, we look to “the impact on potential licensing 
revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed 
markets.”  Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 
448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006).   
 
Murphy is a professional photographer who engages in 
licensing of his work.  If it were possible to reproduce his 
unaltered work, as a whole, without compensation under the 
guise of news reportage—a “traditional, reasonable, or likely 
to be developed market[]” for professional photographers—it 
would surely have a “substantially adverse impact” on his 
ability to license his photographs.  As the Supreme Court has 
noted, “when a commercial use amounts to mere duplication 
of the entirety of an original, it clearly supersedes [the 
original] . . . and serves as a market replacement for it, 
making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original 
will occur.”  Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Such is the case here.   
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Finally, the Station Defendants suggest that there is no 
market for the Image because Carton and Rossi no longer 
work as a team and because the importance of the NJM award 
was fleeting in any event.  However, they cite no precedent 
for the proposition that a copyright owner must prove 
substantial demand for the work in question in order to 
establish infringement.
16
  Clearly, at the time the Image was 
posted on the WKXW website, there was at least one party 
who thought the use of the Image had some value—the 
Millennium Radio Group.  That there may not have been 
much other demand for it hardly means that the Station 
Defendants were entitled to use it for free.  Further, without 
discovery into the relevant markets, such statements are pure 
speculation on the part of the Station Defendants.
17
 
 
3. Nature of the work and amount copied 
 
Although the court spent little time on the second and 
third factors of the fair use analysis, it should be noted that 
they favor Murphy as well.  The second factor is the “nature 
of the work,” with more “creative expression” entitled to 
more protection than “factual works.”  See Campbell, 510 
                                              
16
 Obviously, however, the extent of demand for the work 
may affect the calculation of damages. 
17
 As “fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would 
have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use 
without favorable evidence about relevant markets.”   
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.  The Station Defendants fault 
Murphy for not providing more evidence about the market for 
his work, but this misplaces the evidentiary burden. 
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U.S. at 586-87.  The Image is more creative expression than 
factual work.  See, e.g., Southco., Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 
390 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004).  The third factor is the 
amount of the work copied.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.  The 
Station Defendants copied the Image in its entirety.  Thus, 
both factors weigh in favor of Murphy.  
 
In finding in favor of the Station Defendants, the 
District Court relied heavily on Campbell‟s relative 
discounting of the weight of the second and third factors in 
the context of parody.  However, Campbell explicitly treated 
parody as “a difficult case,” because “[w]hen parody takes 
aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to 
„conjure up‟ . . . the original . . . .”  510 U.S. at 588.  Thus, 
copying is not only helpful, but often necessary, in creating a 
parody, and even extensive copying of creative expression 
may be fair use in genres which rely for their artistic effect, at 
least in part, on the evocation of the original.  The Station 
Defendants do not assert that their use of the unaltered Image 
was a parody.  At the very least, the court has not explained 
how the use by the Station Defendants is of such a nature as 
to require analysis similar to that of parody. 
 
Thus, all four factors here favor Murphy and the 
District Court erred in finding that the Station Defendants‟ 
reproduction of the unaltered Image on the WKXW website 
was a fair use.
18
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 Murphy complains that the District Court did not engage in 
an independent analysis of the posting of the unaltered 
photograph on myspacetv.com.  It does not appear, 
however—at least from the present record—that the analysis 
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C. Discovery and the defamation claim 
 
As mentioned above, when the Station Defendants 
sought summary judgment on Murphy‟s defamation claim, he 
filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (now 56(d)).  
Such a motion is, of course, the proper recourse of a party 
faced with a motion for summary judgment who believes that 
additional discovery is necessary before he can adequately 
respond to that motion.  Doe v. Abington Friends School, 480 
F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007).  “District courts usually grant 
properly filed Rule 56(f) motions as a matter of course.  This 
is particularly so when there are discovery requests 
outstanding or relevant facts are under the control of the 
moving party.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  The standard of appellate review is abuse of 
discretion.  Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 339 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 
A claim of defamation under New Jersey law generally 
requires an analysis closely grounded in the facts of the 
individual case.  “As a general rule, a statement is defamatory 
if it is false, communicated to a third person, and tends to 
lower the subject‟s reputation in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating with 
him.”  Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 161 N.J. 152, 164-65 
(1999).  “In determining whether the statements are 
defamatory, we must consider the content, verifiability, and 
context of the challenged statements.”  Ward v. Zelikovsky, 
136 N.J. 516, 529 (1994).   
                                                                                                     
should be any different from the analysis for the posting on 
the WKXW website. 
29 
 
 
In this case, Murphy has been able to obtain only 
limited information about the fundamental basis of his claim, 
that is, the actual statements Carton and Rossi made on air 
about him.  The Station Defendants destroyed their recording 
of the show shortly after airing, and no transcript has been 
produced.  In such circumstances, in order for Murphy to 
make out his claim, it would obviously be essential for him to 
depose the people who made the statements in the first place, 
that is, Carton and Rossi.  Yet, despite his timely attempts to 
schedule them for depositions, he was unable to do so before 
the District Court granted summary judgment against him.  
 
The Station Defendants have spent little time rebutting 
the specific arguments offered by Murphy as to why the 
information he sought was relevant to the resolution of their 
summary judgment motion.  Instead, they argue that Murphy 
could not have been harmed in any way by the foreclosure of 
discovery because, for the purposes of resolving that motion, 
the District Court accepted as true all allegations made in the 
complaint.  This argument is peculiar, as it implies that, in 
effect, Murphy was obligated to plead in his complaint not 
merely sufficient facts to state his claim for the purposes of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), but also to survive summary judgment.  
The Station Defendants cite no precedent for this approach, 
and we are aware of none.   
 
Unfortunately, the District Court offered essentially no 
analysis in its order denying Murphy‟s 56(f) motion, leaving 
it unclear what, if any, additional analytic basis its denial may 
have had.  Under these circumstances, and given that 
Murphy‟s arguments respecting the importance of the 
information he sought are plausible, it would not be 
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appropriate to defer to the District Court‟s determination on 
this point.  Therefore, with respect to the defamation claims, 
the District Court‟s decision is vacated and remanded to 
permit Murphy to conduct adequate discovery.
19
 
 
III. 
    Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court=s grant of summary judgment in the Station 
Defendants‟ favor on all counts.  
                                              
19
 We therefore do not reach the other issues raised on appeal, 
such as whether an allegation of homosexuality is susceptible 
of a defamatory meaning under New Jersey law. 
